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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1998, and June 30, 1999, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period. These cases are
either of particular interest to the appellate practitioner or provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore, will not be discussed here. Rather, this
article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
examines those areas. This article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of particular issues, nor will it discuss the question of whether
particular errors were harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
In light of the enactment of legislation requiring parental notification, or
judicial waiver thereof, before an abortion may be performed on a minor, the
supreme court' adopted, on an emergency basis, amendments to Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.110(1). 2 The amendments replace the reference to
1. In this article, references to "the supreme court" will constitute references to the
Supreme Court of Florida. The Florida district courts of appeal will be referred to as "the
First District," "the Second District," "the Third District," "the Fourth District," and "the Fifth
District."
2. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 Fla. L. Weekly
S299 (June 24, 1999).
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/2
Musto
an order denying a petition for "termination of pregnancy" with one to an
order denying a petition for "judicial waiver of parental notice of abortion,"
and add a sentence reading, "[n]o filing fee shall be required for an appeal of
the denial of a waiver of parental notice of abortion." In the same opinion,
the court also made appropriate amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4
I1. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
By an administrative order entered by the chief judge and pursuant to
the affirmative vote of a majority of the judges of the court, the First District,
the only Florida appellate court to ever split into subject matter divisions,
dispensed with those divisions.5  6
In 1-888-Traffic Schools v. Chief Circuit Judge, the supreme court
addressed the issue of which court should review challenges to
administrative orders entered by circuit courts.7 Rejecting the First District's
conclusion that only the supreme court can consider such issues, the court
found that review by the district courts is appropriate. The court limited its
prior holding in Wild v. Dozier,9 which had concluded that it had sole
jurisdiction to review judicial assignments to administrative orders making
such assignments.
10
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
The supreme court declined to answer a certified question in State v.
Schebel," concluding that the necessary facts for a determination of the
issues were not contained in the record.1 2  An opinion based on the
"speculative facts" alleged by the party who filed the initial motion in the
trial court "would necessarily be advisory in nature," the court concluded.1
3
The court also declined to answer a certified question in State v. Vazquez,1
4
3. Id. at S300.
4. Id. at S299-S300.
5. Administrative Order 98-3, In re Abolishment of Court Divs., 24 Fla. L. Weekly
D84 (1st Dist. CL App. Dec. 15, 1998).
6. 734 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999).
7. Id. at 413.
8. Id. at 416.
9. 672 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1996).
10. Traffic Schools, 734 So. 2d at 415.
11. 723 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1999).
12. Id. at 830.
13. Id.
14. 718 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1998).
1999]
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basing its action on the fact that the district court had not ruled on the issue
raised by the question . 16
In Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 97-04, Re: Elizabeth L. Hapner,
the court determined that it has the authority to tax costs in a proceeding of
the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC").17 The court limited the
costs in the case to certain charges relating to the court reporter and the
transcript, 1 concluding that attorneys' fees may not be awarded as costs. 9
The court directed the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration Committee
to draft a proposed rule addressing the assessment of costs in a JQC
proceeding.
V. APPEALABLE ORDERS
The Fourth District provided some guidance with regard to the manner
of review of orders impacting nonparties to trial court proceedings. In Shook
v. Alter,21 a lawyer representing a party in the trial court sought certiorari
review of an order holding him in indirect civil contempt.22 The district
court concluded that because the order was final as far as the lawyer was
concerned, review was proper by appeal, not by certiorari. 2 The appellate
court noted that this distinction was important because a petitioner seekin
certiorari must meet a heavier burden than an appellant taking an appeal
and stated that it was publishing its order in the case "so that the Bar will
know that, where a final order is entered against a non-party [sic] such as,
for example, a lawyer or a witness, the appropriate method for review of that
order is by final appeal." s
Numerous other cases discussed the issue of whether particular orders
were reviewable on appeal. These cases included the following: Meyers v.
Metropolitan Dade County (jury's verdict as to liability in a bifurcated
proceeding was the equivalent of an order determining liability under the
interlocutory appeal rule and was therefore appealable under that rule);
15. Id. at 756.
16. 737 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1999).
17. Id. at 1075.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 715 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
22. Id. at 1082-83.
23. Id. at 1083.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S135 (Mar. 18, 1999).
[Vol. 24:1
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Thomas v. Thomas2 7 (denial of a motion to transfer a pending modification
of a child custody case to another state was appealable as a determination in
the nature of venue); Okeelanta Corp. v. McDonald8 (rule providing for
appeals from orders granting or denying certification of a class does not
extend jurisdiction to orders ruling on motions to decertify a class and an
appeal from such an order was therefore dismissed); Key Club Associates v.
Mayer29 (nonfinal order dismissing counterplaintiffs' request for certifica-
tion of their class for purposes of their compulsory counterclaim was appeal-
able); Croteau v. Operator Service of South Florida, Inc. (order denying a
motion to enforce a settlement agreement which constituted the equivalent of
a partial final judgment was appealable); Blakeslee v. Morse Operations,
Inc.3 (conditional order of dismissal, requiring a plaintiff to arbitrate within
thirty days or have the case dismissed, was not appealable as an order of
dismissal); Red Bird Laundry v. Park32 (appeal from order denying
attorneys' fees was not proper when the final order in the underlying action
had not yet been entered); Wanner v. State33 (order granting bank's motion to
intervene in a criminal case as a victim for purposes of restitution was not
appealable); Crawford v. Dwoskin34 (order remanding a matter to an
arbitrator to clarify certain portions of an award was not appealable).
VI. INSTITUTION OF APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
In Holden Avenue Inter-Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Orange
County,35 nine days after an action by the Orange County Board of County
Commissioners, the petitioner filed a notice of intention to file a petition for
writ of certiorari to review the Board's decision 3 6 This action was taken
pursuant to a county code provision which provides that such a notice must
be filed in the circuit court within ten days after the decision at issue and that
the petition must be filed within sixty days after the Board's ruling. 7 The
petitioner filed the petition within the time provided by the code, but after
the expiration of the thirty-day period allowed for seeking certiorari under
27. 724 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
28. 730 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
29. 718 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
30. 721 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
31. 720 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
32. 728 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
33. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D924 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1999).
34. 729 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
35. 719 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
36. Id. at 1003.
37. Id.
1999]
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38Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(2). The circuit court then
granted the County's motion to dismiss the proceeding as untimely.
39
Although agreeing that the petitioner could not rely on the code provision
because the Florida Constitution provides that only the supreme court has
the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure, the Fifth District
granted certiorari .41 The court concluded that the notice of intention to file
the petition, which was clearly filed within the time frame established by the
appellate rule, was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and that it
plainly ?laced the County on notice that the petitioner intended to seek42 .43
review. Noting that the petitioner was "understandably misled" by the
code, the court "in the interests of justice,"44 treated the notice of intention to
file the petition as the petition itself and the actual petition as an amended
petition. 5
In its opinion in Horst v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, the
Second District called for a legislative change with regard to the time for
instituting appeals to the Unemployment Appeals Commission.47 Under
section 443.151(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, such appeals must be taken
within twenty days of the order under review." In the case at issue, the
appeal was dismissed because it was instituted twenty-five days after the
order.49 The district court accordingly indicated that it was "constrained to,,50
affirm the Commission's ruling." The court noted, however, that the case
was not an isolated one and that it "frequently affirms without written
opinion when the Commission dismisses an appeal because it was filed a few
days late." 51 In asking the legislature to establish a thirty day period that
would equal the period given in other civil and administrative appeals, 52 the
court pointed out that claimants are typically not represented by counsel, are
often ill prepared to prosecute a legal appeal, are appealing because they are
unemployed and did not receive benefits, and "may be distracted from filing
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Holden, 719 So. 2d at 1003-04.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1003-04.
44. Id. at 1004.
45. Holden, 719 So. 2d at 1004.
46. 725 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
47. Id. at 1267.
48. FLA. STAT. § 443.151(4)(b) (1999).
49. Horst, 725 So. 2d at 1267.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
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an appeal within the abbreviated period by their need to search for anotherjob."In State v. West,54 after the state instituted an appeal from a sentence
that constituted a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, the
trial court, which had not previously given any reasons for the departure, sua
sponte made written findings of its reasons.55 The Fifth District reversed the
sentence, stating that "the trial court's belated effort.., to supply written
reasons after an appeal was taken cannot cure the defect since the trial court
had by that time lost jurisdiction."5 6
VII. STAYS
In Mann v. Brantley,57 an appeal was taken from an order granting a
new trial.58 The trial court denied a stay and the appellants sought review of
the denial in the Fourth District.5 9 That court pointed out that since an order
granting a new trial is a nonfinal order, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(f) precluded the trial court from entering a final order during the
pendency of the appeal.60 In light of that fact, and the fact that the holding of
a new trial while the appeal was pending would be a waste of money and
judicial resources, the district court found the denial of the stay to constitute
an abuse of discretion.6'
The appellants in Begonia Corp. v. Nam Financial Corp.6 2 sought
review of an order imposing sanctions in the amount of $100,000 against
them for frustrating orders of the court relating to a sale under a final
judgment of foreclosure. 3 They sought a supersedeas bond as to the amount
of the sanctions, but the trial court refused to set or allow such a bond and
thus any stay pending review.64 Reviewing the denial of stay, the Fourth
District noted that while the final judgment of foreclosure itself may not
have been solely for the payment of money, such as to create an entitlement
to bond under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(1), the
53. Id.
54. 718 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
55. Id. at 267.
56. Id.
57. 732 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
58. Id. at 1091.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 724 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
63. Id. at 714.
64. Id.
1999]
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sanctions order was reasonably understood as such a judgment.65 The court
found that an order lacking words allowing for immediate execution did not
remove it from the realm of orders essentially requiring the payment of a
fixed sum of money and that the appellants were therefore entitled to bond
the sanctions order while they pursued their appeal.
66
The Fifth District, in Garvin v. Jerome,67 rejected a contention that
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), which provides for
automatic stays pending review when public bodies and officials file notices
of appeal, applied to stay an election when the appellant, a public official,
appealed from an order denying a request for an injunction to halt the
conduct of the election. 68 Aligning itself with decisions of the Second and
69Fourth Districts, the First District, in Taylor v. Barnett Bank of North
Central Florida, N.A., 70 found that the provision of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code,71 providing for an automatic stay of all legal proceedings "against the
debtor," applies on appeal when the original proceedings were against the
debtor, "regardless of whether the debtor is an appellant or appellee." 72 The
court recognized that the Third District had reached a contrary conclusion,73
but indicated that the Third District's decision was reached at a time when
there was a dearth of law on the subject and that since the federal courts
began considering the issue, all six courts of appeals that have addressed the
question have taken the approach adopted by the Second and Fourth
Districts.74
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 721 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 735 So. 2d 1284
(Fla. 1999).
68. Id. at 1229.
69. Crowe Group, Inc. v. Garner, 691 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Florida E. Dev. Co. v. Len-Hal Realty, Inc., 636 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
70. 737 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1995).
72. Taylor, 737 So. 2d at 1105.
73. Shop in the Grove, Ltd. v. Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 425 So. 2d 1138 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
74. See Farley v. Henson, 2 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1993); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp.
v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1987); Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys.,
Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d. Cir 1986); Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson
Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 227, 230, n.4 (5th Cir. 1986); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711
F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1983); Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel
Corp., 682 F.2d 446,449 (3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 24:1
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VIII. RECORD ON APPEAL
The Second District, in Licea v. Blancher,75 found notes made by jurors
in the record on appeal.76 The court found that the trial court had erred when
it preserved the notes and that the notes should have been destroyed as soon
as the jury was discharged.77 In affirming the judgment, the court sealed the
envelope containing the notes and remanded with instructions to correct the
record by unsealing the envelope and destroying the notes.78
IX. TRANSCRIPTS
In Palomares v. Palomares,79 the appellant filed a "Motion To Require
Court Reporters To Charge A Reasonable Rate For Transcription." 80 The
court noted that the court reporter charged $5.95 per page for appellate
transcripts, a fee that included an original and two copies, but only $3.50 per
page for non-appellate transcripts.8 1 Noting that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.200(b)(2) allows parties to acquire an original transcript and
make additional copies at their own expense, the court concluded that the
court reporter should make available an original copy only and that it should
. 82do so at a cost not to exceed its charge for a nonappellate transcript. The
court stated that the purpose of the appellate rule would be defeated if court
reporters were permitted to require designating parties to pay for copies as
well as the original.83 "Although we recognize that we do not have the
authority to fix and determine the reasonableness of a fee," the court
continued, "we can as a matter of law require the court reporter to follow the
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida."84
The Second District, in Mathis v. State,85 reversed the denial of a
petition for writ of mandamus which sought an order compelling the court
reporter to inform the petitioner of the cost for transcripts of certain trial
proceedings.
86
75. 724 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct App. 1999).
76. Id. at 663.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 730 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
80. Id. at 706.
81. Id. at 706-07.
82. Id. at 707.
83. Id. at 708.
84. Palomares, 730 So. 2d at 708.
85. 722 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998).
86. Id. at 236.
1999]
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Further, in Manuel v. State,87 the First District reversed a judgment and
remanded a case for a new trial when the trial transcript was not produced in
accordance with the procedure mandated by the rules of judicial
administration and an order of the chief judge of the trial court." In that
* 89
case, no court reporter was present during trial. Instead, the proceedings
were tape recorded and transcribed by a deputy clerk.9° The court pointed
out a number of problems with the quality of the transcript, but emphasized
that its conclusion was not based on these concerns. 91 Rather, the court
found that the principal problem was the fact "that the transcript was not
produced by a licensed court reporter, and, therefore," was "not the official
record" of [the] proceedings. 92 Thus, the court pointed out that it would
have reached the same conclusion "[e]ven if the transcript were otherwise
letter perfect."
93
X. MOTIONS
After setting forth a series of motions filed by the parties and denying
all but one of them, the Fourth District, in Slizyk v. Smilack,94 warned the
parties "that motions are not to be used to present arguments which should
be addressed in the briefs... nor to delay the progress of the appeal. 'g
XI. AMICUS CURIAE
The Third District endorsed and adopted the principles stated in Chief
Judge Posner's opinion in Ryan v. CFTC9 6 in denying a motion to appear and
file a brief as an amicus curiae.97 In Ryan, Chief Judge Posner indicated that
"[a]fter 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of which
[had] not assisted the judges," he had decided "that it would be good to
scrutinize these motions [for leave to file amicus curiae briefs] in a more
careful, indeed a 'fish-eyed,' fashion." 98 The opinion notes that most amicus
87. 737 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
88. Id. at 583.
89. Id. at 581.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 582.
92. Manuel, 737 So. 2d at 582.
93. Id. at 582-83.
94. 734 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
95. Id. at 1167.
96. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
97. Rathkamp v. Department of Community Affairs, 730 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
98. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063.
[Vol. 24:1
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curiae briefs are filed by allies of the parties and duplicate the arguments
made in the parties' briefs, "in effect merely extending the length of the
litigant's brief."99 It went on to state that an amicus brief should normally be
allowed when a party is not represented or is not represented competently,
when the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by
the case under review, and when the amicus has unique information or a
unique perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the parties
are able to provide.100 "Otherwise," Chief Judge Posner concluded, "leave to
file an aniicus curiae brief should be denied." Noting that "[t]he bane of
lawyers is prolixity and duplication," 1 2 Chief Judge Posner summarized by
stating that "we judges should be assiduous to bar the gates to amicus curiae
briefs that fail to present convincing reasons why the parties' briefs do not
give us all the help we need for deciding the appeal.
10 3
XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF CIRCUIT JUDGES IN THEIR APPELLATE
CAPACITIES
The First District found that a circuit judge considering a petition for a
writ of certiorari erred in denying a motion for disqualification in Smith v.
Santa Rosa Island Authority. 04 The court found that the procedures for
seeking disqualification that are set forth in Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.160 were applicable. 105 The court rejected the argument
that the rule applies only to judges sitting in their capacities as trial judges,0 6
pointing to the fact that rule 2.160(a), although titled "Disqualification of
Trial Judges," provides that the rule aplies to "county and circuit judges in
all matters in all divisions of court."'
XIII. SANCTIONS
After the Third District issued a per curiam affirmance without opinion,
counsel for the appellant in Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc.,'Os filed a
motion for rehearing that the court considered to be "solely ... a tool to
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1064.
103. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1064.
104. 729 So. 2d 944 (Fla. lstDist. CL App. 1998).
105. Id. at 946.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1999]
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express his personal displeasure with this Court's conclusion,"' 9 and thus "a
flagrant violation of [Florida] Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 9.330(a)."' 10
The motion included the following language:
4. For this Court to simply ignore all the legal precedents is
atrocious. Whatever hapened to Justice and Fairness? We come
before this Court for rulings which are based on the well-
established law. We do not come to hear Nothing, which is
precisely what a Per Curiam Affirmed opinion tell us. NOTHING!
What a "cop-out." But I suppose, when you don't have a good
reason for doing something, then you do nothing and don't even
have to explain it.
6. From the Opinion rendered in this case, it would appear to be an
exercise in futility to even try and get a fair hearing before this
tribunal, and I suppose the reality is that people have to suffer, as a
result. However, if there is one courageous Jurist out there who
would take a moment to look again at this case, perhaps my faith in
the system would be restored, even though I realize that my faith 'is
not the issue.'
11
'
Because of what the court termed "counsel for the appellant's flagrant abuse
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure" and because the court found the motion
"to be both frivolous and insulting," the court ordered the appellant's
counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon him12 The
Clerk was directed to provide a copy of the court's opinion to The Florida
Bar.'
13
The attorney filed a response to the court's order and a second opinion,
ordering the attorney to pay $2500 as a sanction was filed. 1 4 The court
found that the response attempted "to explain and justify the language used"
in the motion and that in some respects, the response made the attorney's
"conduct appear to be even more egregious."" As examples, the court
quoted portions of the response which stated, "[m]y intent in writing the
109. Id. at 876.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 877 (emphasis in original).
112. Banderas, 716 So. 2d at 877.
113. Id. at 877-78.
114. Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 718 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
115. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
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[m]otion was based on my belief that my comments and criticism did not
exceed the boundaries of truth," and, "I do not believe that what I wrote
could be construed as being false."1 16
In Rampart Life Associates, Inc. v. Turkish,' 7 counsel for the appellees
moved to supplement the record with a deposition taken after the entry of the
order being appealed.1 ' s After this motion was denied, counsel filed a brief
that made reference, in a footnote, to the contents of the deposition and
pointed out that the motion to supplement the record had been denied by the
court. 119 The Fourth District indicated that "[it would have been bad enough
if counsel.., had included the information in appellees' brief without
moving to supplement the record," 1 but that "[tlo make matters worse,'121
counsel did so after the motion was denied. 2 The court stated:
In doing so... [counsel] violated two ethical rules: (1) Rule 4-
3(5)(a) of the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct which
provides that a lawyer "shall not seek to influence a judge
... except as permitted by law or the rules of court;" and (2) Rule
4-3.4(c) which provides that counsel shall not "knowingly disobey
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal." 12
Accordingly, the court struck the footnote and sanctioned the appellees'
attorney by assessing $500 in attorney's fees to paid to opposing counsel.124
XIV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Certiorari
The supreme court clarified the scope of certiorari review with regard
to pretrial discovery matters in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boecher.12 The
court began its discussion by pointing out that in Martin-Johnson, Inc. v.
Savage, it described certiorari relief as an "'extraordinary remedy' that
'should not be used to circumvent the interlocutory appeal rule which
116. Id. (quoting appellant's response motion).
117. 730 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
118. Id. at 385.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Rampart, 730 So. 2d at 385.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999).
126. 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987).
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authorizes appeal from only a few types of nonfinal orders."" 27 In the same
opinion, the court indicated that not every erroneous discovery order creates
certiorari jurisdiction and focused on the existence of "irreparable harm" as
the governing standard.128
The court then discussed its opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Langston,129 which cited to Martin-Johnson with approval and disapproved
contrary appellate court decisions to the extent that "they could be
interpreted as 'automatically equating irrelevant discovery requests with
irreparable harm."' 30 In Langston, however, the court quashed the district
court decision under review "to the extent that it permit[ted] discovery even
when it has been affirmatively established that such discovery is neither• - • ,,131
relevant nor will lead to the discovery of relevant information.
The court went on to note that this language in Langston apparently
"caused at least one appellate court to experience 'an increase in the number
of petitions for certiorari seeking review of discovery orders.', 132 Noting
that Judge Klein concluded in Eberhardt that the decision in Langston did
not expand certiorari review in the discovery context, the court expressed its
agreement with Judge Klein's analysis and reiterated that Martin-Johnson
properly sets forth the parameters for certiorari relief in pretrial discovery.'33
Citing Boecher, the Fourth District, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Cumming, 3 stated "that certiorari does not lie to review the relevance of
discovery, since the disclosure of information that is merely irrelevant is not
likely to cause irreparable harm within the meaning of Martin-Johnson."'
35
The court noted the petitioner's reliance on its prior decision in Nissan
Motors Corp. v. Espinosa, 136 which reversed an order requiring disclosure of
irrelevant discovery information without discussion of whether the order
posed a threat of irreparable harm.' 37 To the extent that Nissan Motors can
be read as dispensing with the irreparable harm factor, the court indicated
127. Boecher, 733 So. 2d at 999 (quoting Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d
1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987)).
128. Id.
129. 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995).
130. Boecher, 733 So. 2d at 999 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91,
95 (Fla. 1995)).
131. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 95 (Fla. 1995)).
132. Id. (quoting Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 666 So. 2d 1024, 1024 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
133. Id. at 999-1000.
134. 736 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
135. Id. at 1248.
136. 716 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
137. Wal-Mart Stores, 736 So. 2d at 1248 (citing Nissan Motors Corp. v. Espinosa, 716
So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
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that it conflicts with Boecher and cannot be relied upon as an expansion of
the court's certiorari jurisdiction.138
Clarifying its earlier denial without opinion of a petition for writ of
certiorari in Casey-Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 39 the Fifth District aligned itself
with rulings of other district courts, which have held that such a denial is not
a ruling on the merits and does not establish law of the case. 140 "Of course,"
the court continued, "if the court of appeal chooses to do so it can issue a
denial on the merits, which would establish law of the case."
141
A number of cases dealt with the question of whether particular orders
were reviewable by certiorari. The First and Fifth Districts each considered
whether certiorari is appropriate to review comprehensive plan amendments
directly related to proposed small-scale development activities. This issue
was specifically left open by the supreme court when it ruled in Martin
County v. Yusem' 42 that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are
legislative, rather than quasi-judicial decisions, and therefore can only be
challenged through original proceedings, as opposed to review proceedings
such as certiorari, in the circuit courts.143  Both of the district courts
concluded that the same rationale applied to small-scale amendments.
In City of Jacksonville Beach v. Coastal Development of North Florida,
Inc.,144 the First District based its determination on its conclusion "that all
comprehensive plan amendment requests necessarily involve the formulation
of policy, rather than its mere application" and that whatever the size of
"proposed development, a comprehensive plan amendment request will
require that the governmental entity determine whether it is socially
desirable to reformulate the policies previously formulated for the orderly
future growth of the community." 145
The Fifth District, in Fleeman v. City of St. Augustine Beach,14
discussed some of the practical reasons for its conclusion.
We cannot discern any good reason for the courts to treat small-
parcel amendments differently than any other amendments or
adoption of comprehensive land use plans. To do so would invite
138. Wal-Mart Stores, 736 So. 2d at 1248.
139. 735 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
140. Id. at 610 (citing Degrasse v. Wertheim, 566 So. 2d 515, 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Johnson v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 542 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988); Bevan v. Wanicka, 505 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
141. Id.
142. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
143. Id. at 1295.
144. 730 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
145. Id. at 794.
146. 728 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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more uncertainty in this still unsettled area of law. How small must
the parcel be? How many other people must be affected?
147
Both courts certified to the supreme court that the question at issue is one of
great public importance,' 48 although the Fifth District did not formulate a
specific question.1 49 That court did, however, also certify that its decision
conflicted with that of the Third District in Debes v. CiV of Key West.' 50
The supreme court in Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc.,15 found that certiorari
is inappropriate to review trial court orders striking parties' demands for jury
trials because such orders do not cause irreparable injury that cannot be
152
remedied on direct appeal. The court's opinion resolved conflict among
the district courts by upholding the Fourth District decision that was under
review' 53 and disapproving decisions of the First,
154 Second, 155 and Third156
Districts on the same issue to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
supreme court's opinion. 57  158
In Schneider v. Schneider, the Fourth District relied on Jaye in
concluding that certiorari could not be used to review an order requiring a
trustee to retain counsel.159 The court stated that "if the importance of the
right to trial by jury could not displace the requirement of injury that cannot
be corrected on appeal," as concluded in Jaye, "then neither can the right of
self-representation."'1' The court found to be misplaced the petitioner's
reliance on federal cases allowing review of comparable orders under the
collateral order doctrine because "Florida has not adopted the doctrine, and
certainly under Jaye it could not be used as a basis to avoid the requirement
of irreparable injury uncorrectable on final appeal."''
147. Id. at 1180.
148. City of Jacksonville Beach, 730 So. 2d at 792; Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1178.
149. Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1178.
150. Id. (citing Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997)).
151. 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998).
152. Id. at 215.
153. Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 698 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), decision
approved by 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998).
154. Quality Coffee Serv., Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
155. Johnson Eng'g, Inc. v. Pate, 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Spring v. Ronel Ref., Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
157. Jaye, 720 So. 2d at 216.
158. 732 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
159. Id. at 1148 (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
160. Id. (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
161. Id. at 1149 (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
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The petitioner in Martin v. Doe162 sought certiorari review of an order
entered by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. 63 The district
court noted that whether it had certiorari jurisdiction under such circum-
stances was "questionable."' 64 However, it did not determine the issue in
light of its conclusion that the petitioner had not shown irreparable injury. 65
Other cases included the following: Sheley v. Florida Parole
Commission'66 (certiorari rather than direct appeal appropriate method of
review of circuit court's denial of petition for writ of mandamus challenging
order of the Florida Parole Commission); Pee v. Aaron 67 (certiorari granted
to quash a trial court order requiring plaintiffs' counsel to accept documents
from defense counsel by fax); Williams v. Spears161 (certiorari review of
denial of parents' motion for summary judgment warranted when the motion
challenged the constitutionality of a statute authorizing courts to order
grandparent visitation if the parents' marriage has been dissolved because
the continuation of the trial court proceedings would violate the parents'
right to privacy by exploring questions of parental decision-making and
considering the best interests of the child); Florida Commission on169
Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology v. State (court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for certiorari when the order at issue was fully
favorable to the party seeking review and the party only claimed departure
from the essential requirements of law was a conclusion in the nature of
dicta); City of Tallahassee v. Kovach170 (challenges to a municipality's
annexation of property must be conducted by certiorari pursuant to section
171.081 of the Florida Statutes); and Panagakos v. Laufer 71 (court lacked
jurisdiction to review, by certiorari, an order denying a motion to dismiss,
based on a claim that allegedly defamatory statements were privileged from
suit because they were made during the course of judicial proceedings and
court declined to address whether certiorari jurisdiction would lie to review
a claim of judicial proceedings privilege denied after summary judgment).
162. 731 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
163. Id. at 806.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 807.
166. 720 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998).
167. 719 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
168. 719 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
169. 716 So. 2d345 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
170. 733 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
171. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D801 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1999).
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B. Mandamus
Cases involving requests for mandamus included the following: Soto v.
Board of County Commissioners1 2 (mandamus appropriate to compel Board
of County Commissioners to process a grievance filed by a county employee
in situation in which the county had provided that employee disputes would
be resolved through a grievance process); Pisarri v. State173 (mandamus not
available to require Florida Department of Law Enforcement to remove an
individual's name from its list of sexual predators when the individual was
included on the list pursuant to a written finding by a court and an appeal
from the court's order would have been the appropriate manner to allege that
the individual was erroneously found to be a sexual predator); and Donahue
v. Vaughn'74 (mandamus denied for various reasons when petitioner sought
to have the court order his former attorney to furnish him, free of charge,
copies of documents in his case; reasons included the fact that mandamus in
these circumstances only applies to government officials, not private
lawyers).
C. Prohibition
In Anderson v. Glass,175 the Fifth District granted a writ of prohibition
solely because the trial court delayed too long before ruling on a motion for
disqualification. 176 Without discussing the merit or lack of merit of the
motion, the district court relied on the fact that the trial court took the matter
under advisement for more than thirty days before entering an order denying
the motion and the fact that Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(f)
requires a trial judge to "immediately" enter either an order granting
disqualification or denying the motion. 7
In Smith v. State,178 a criminal defendant's petition for a writ of prohibi-
tion on speedy trial grounds was summarily denied.179 After he was con-
victed, he apealed and raised the same issue that had formed the basis for
the petition. The Fifth District noted that other district courts disagree as
to whether a summary denial of a writ of prohibition constitutes an absolute
172. 716 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
173. 724 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
174. 721 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
175. 727 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
176. Id. at 1147.
177. Id.
178. 738 So. 2d410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
179. Id. at 411.
180. Id.
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bar against raising the same issue on direct appeal."' In this regard, it
pointed out that the Third"' and Fourth"' Districts have held that denials of
petitions will be, unless otherwise indicated, rulings on the merits, 184 and
that the Second District'85 has held that a summary denial of a petition does
not preclude the raising of the same issue in a subsequent appeal unless it
can be affmnatively established that the denial was on the merits or that a
merits determination was the only possible basis for denial.186 The Fifth
District stated that although it had not previously articulated its policy, it had
followed procedures similar to those practiced by the Second District.187
Notwithstanding what it termed "the persuasive reasoning set forth by" the
Third and Fourth Districts, the court "decline[d] to depart from [its]
established practice."
188
The Second District found, in Panagakos v. Laufer,1s9 that prohibition
was not available to review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to
dismiss based on a claim that the complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations. 19° The court recognized that in Swartzman v. Harlan,1 9 it issued
a writ of prohibition because an action was barred by the statute of
limitations. r92 To the extent that the decision in Swartzman, which did not
specifically address the appropriateness of prohibition, suggested that
prohibition is the proper remedy, the court indicated that it believed that the
supreme court's decision in Mandico v. Taos Construction, Inc.,193 which
held that prohibition may not be used to raise the affirmative defense of
workers' compensation immunity, required a contrary conclusion.
194
181. Id. at411-12.
182. Obanion v. State, 496 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Hobbs v. State, 689 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
184. Smith,738 So. 2dat411.
185. Sumner v. Sumner, 707 So. 2d 934,935 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
186. Smith, 738 So. 2d at 411-12.
187. Id. at412.
188. Id.
189. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D801 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1999).
190. Id. at D801.
191. 535 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.,1988).
192. Panagakos, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D801 (citing Swartzman v. Harlan, 535 So. 2d
605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
193. 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992).
194. Panagakos, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D801.
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D. Habeas Corpus
In Harvard v. Singletary,195 the supreme court declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to consider an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus,
instead transferring the matter to the circuit court where the petitioner was
incarcerated. 196 In doing so, the court took the opportunity to explain that it
will take similar actions with regard to future writ petitions which "raise
substantial issues of fact or present individualized issues that do not require
immediate resolution by this Court, or are not the type of case in which an
opinion from this Court would provide important guiding principles for the
other courts of this State."'197
The court also indicated that it would continue its practice of denying
petitions when it is able to determine from the face of the petition that the
claim is successive or procedurally barred. 198 Discussing its policy, the court
noted that review of petitions that fall in the above categories "requires the
expenditure of substantial time that would otherwise be devoted to the
performance of our unique duties as the State's highest court."' 99 The court
then concluded that "[c]ommon sense dictates that we reserve our exercise of
original writ jurisdiction for cases which require this Court's specific or
immediate attention."w
In Basse v. State,2° 1 the supreme court considered a challenge to an
order of the Second District that struck a 117 page petition for writ of habeas
corpus and ordered that an amended petition of no more than fifty pages be
filed. 2 2 In support of its order, the district court had cited Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(5), which limits appellate briefs to fifty
pages. °3 The supreme court agreed with the petitioner that the rule does not
apply to writ petitions, but found that the district court had the inherent
authority to place reasonable page limitations on filings so long as the rules
do not provide otherwise.2 4 The court also found that the fifty page limit of
the rule provided a reasonable benchmark for the district court to use in
exercising its authority, but cautioned that petitioners must be afforded the
opportunity to show good cause for filing longer petitions and that when
such cause is shown, the court must allow petitioners to exceed the limit to
195. 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999).
196. Id. at 1021.
197. Id. at 1021-22 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 1022.
199. Id. at 1023.
200. Harvard, 733 So 2d at 1023.
201. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S273 (Jun. 10, 1999).
202. Id. at S273.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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the extent necessary for adequate presentation of their claims.205 The court
also referred to the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee the issue of
whether the rules should contain a provision governing the length of original
writ petitions.2
Other cases dealing with requests for habeas corpus included the
following: Minott v. State2' (circuit court order denying habeas corpus
vacated when the petitioner was not given the opportunity to serve a reply to
the respondent's response) and S.C. v. Peterson2°s (habeas corpus not
available to individual on home detention pursuant to section 985.03(18)(c)
of the Florida Statutes).
E. Coram Nobis
The supreme court, in Wood v. State,2w determined that the time
limitations for filing motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 should also apply to petitions for writs of error
210
coram nobis. The court amended the criminal rule to include such
petitions and stated that the time limitations would apply to all defendants
adjudicated guilty after the date the decision was filed (May 27, 1999) and
that all defendants adjudicated prior to the filing date would have two years
from that date to file claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis. -11
212In Gregersen v. State, the Fourth District found that coram nobis is
available to challenge a trial court's failure to inform a criminal defendant of
213the deportation consequences of a plea. The court recognized that the
Third District had reached a contrary conclusion in Peart v. State.2 14 The
supreme court has accepted jurisdiction to review both Gregersen and Peart.
In addition, the Third District, in adhering to its approach in Van Tuyn v.
215 2State, certified conflict with Gregersen.
205. Id.
206. Basse, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S273 n.1.
207. 718 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
208. 718 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
209. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S240 (May 27, 1999).
210. Id. at S241.
211. Id. at S241-42.
212. 714 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 728 So. 2d 205
(Fla. 1998).
213. Id. at 1196.
214. Id. (citing Peart v. State, 705 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
215. 736 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
216. Id. at 71.
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XV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Orders Reviewable
In State v. Schultz,217 the supreme court concluded that a defendant
found guilty may appeal from an order withholding adjudication without
placing the defendant on probation.218 The court resolved a conflict between
the districts by approving the Fourth District decision under review 219 and
disapproving the Second District's decision in Martin v. State.m2
The state moved to dismiss a defendant's appeal in Jefferson v. State.1
The state pointed to the legislature's recent enactment of the Criminal
222Appeal Reform Act, which states that an appeal may not be taken from a
judgment or order of a trial court unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is
properly preserved or, if not, would constitute fundamental error, and
asserted that since the alleged sentencing errors in the case under review
were neither preserved nor fundamental, the Third District lacked
223jurisdiction. The court denied the state's motion, concluding that the
legislation did not limit its jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the
question of whether errors have been preserved and, if so, whether they have
merit are issues to be decided on appeal, not on a motion to dismiss.2 4 The
court did certify to the supreme court a question of great public importance
that asked whether, in light of the legislative enactment, the failure to
preserve a sentencing error that is not fundamental is a jurisdictional
impediment that should result in the dismissal of an appeal. 
22 5
Also certifying questions of great public importance on this subject was
the decision of the Second District in Bain v. State. M6  Reiterating the
conclusion it reached in Denson v. State,227 the court opined that the
Criminal Appeal Reform Act does limit the jurisdiction of Florida's
appellate courts to entertain appeals from final orders in criminal cases.228
217. 720 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1998).
218. Id. at 247.
219. Schultz v. State, 700 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
220. 600 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. 724 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 732 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1999).
222. FLA. STAT. § 924.051 (1999).
223. Jefferson, 724 So. 2d at 105-06.
224. Id. at 106.
225. Id.
226. 730 So. 2d 296,306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
227. 711 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
228. Bain, 730 So. 2d at 302.
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In State v. Gaines,229 after the state presented its case, the defense
moved for the first time to suppress certain evidence2 30 The trial court
granted the motion, and after the state announced that it had no other
evidence with which to prove its case, entered an order dismissing the
case.231 The state appealed from the order of dismissal, asserting that the
trial court erroneously suppressed the evidence.232 The Fourth District
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, which contended that
any error in the suppression ruling was moot because retrying the defendant
would constitute a double jeopardy violation. 23 The district court indicated
that the state should have argued to the trial court to exercise its discretion
not to consider the motion to suppress unless the defendant would agree to a
mistrial in the event the motion was to be granted.2 4 In a motion for
rehearing, the State pointed to section 924.07(1)(1) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides that the state may appeal "[a]n order or ruling suppressing
evidence or evidence in limine at trial"'2 5 was pointed to by the state. 2 6 The
court denied rehearing, finding that the provision violated article V, section
4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, which vests exclusive power to authorize
non-final appeals in the supreme court.2 7
Other cases dealing with the question of whether particular orders were
reviewable included the following: State v. Gray s (state may not appeal
from orders modifying probation or community control) and State v.
Figueroa239 (state does not have the right to appeal from a legal sentence
entered over the state's objection after the trial court advised the defendant
that if he pled to the crimes charged, it would withhold adjudication and
place him on probation).
B. Bond Pending Appeal
The trial court in Coolley v. State240 denied bond pending appeal,
relying on four factors:
229. 731 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 7-8.
232. Id. at 8.
233. Id.
234. Gaines, 731 So. 2d at 8.
235. FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)(1) (1997).
236. Gaines, 731 So. 2d at 8-9.
237. Id. at 9.
238. 721 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
239. 728 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
240. 720 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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1) Following a finding of guilt by a jury there "remains a high
presumption of guilt."
2) As a firearm was used in the offense, the defendant poses a risk
to the community.
3) Coolley's conviction involves a mandatory prison term.
4) The trial court feared that the Coolley would not appear for any
future court dates if released on bail.241
The Second District granted the defendant's motion for release and
directed the trial court to set a reasonable bond.242 The court "disagree[d]
that there is but a presumption of guilt after a jury returns a guilty
verdict." 243 The court recognized that there is a presumption of correctness
that follows the verdict, but said that "this presumption applies in every
criminal case and is not, therefore, an appropriate factor upon which to base
the denial of a bond in a specific case. The court then stated that it did
"not consider the use of a firearm, in and of itself, conclusive evidence that a
defendant poses a risk to the community.'245 The court went on to indicate
that if the legislature had seen fit to deny an appeal bond to any offender
who used a firearm or who faced a minimum mandatory sentence,
appropriate legislation to that effect would have been enacted. 246 Finally, the
court found no factual basis for the conclusion that the defendant would not
appear for future court dates if released. 247
C. Capital Cases
In Arbelaez v. Butterworth,248 a petition was filed by the Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel ("CCRC") for the Southern Region of Florida,
which asked the court to "exercise its all writs jurisdiction to stay all
applicable time limits, court proceedings, and executions until adequate
funding was provided to CCRC, or until.., the start of the next fiscal
year." 19 Subsequently, the CCRCs for both the Northern and Southern
Regions filed separate all writs petitions asking the court to "impose a
general moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty until the CCRCs
241. Id. at 598.
242. Id. at 599.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Coolley, 720 So. 2d at 598.
246. Id. at 599.
247. Id.
248. 738 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999).
249. Id. at 326.
[Vol. 24:1
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/2
Musto
are adequately funded pursuant to a caseload methodology." 2 0 Finding that
since the actions were filed, "the structure of the CCRC offices has been
substantially modified and the funding has significantly changed and
increased through two legislative sessions,"251 the court concluded that there
was "no present case in controversy"252 and denied the petitions.
253
D. Appeals From Denials of Motions for Postonviction Relief
In Gantt v. State,254 the Fourth District made it clear that it is not
necessary for court apointed counsel to follow the procedures set forth in
Anders v. California, which allow attorneys to satisfy their ethical obliga-
tions when they can identify no meritorious issues to raise in direct appeals
of convictions and sentences, before seeking to withdraw from appeals of
orders denying postconviction relief.25 6 Pointing out that the Anders proce-
dures stem from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court concluded
that since the appointment of an attorney to handle an appeal from an order
denying a motion for postconviction relief is not a matter of right, but is
based on due process considerations, the procedures need not be followedY27
The court also took the opportunity to remind the trial court that the
Criminal Appeals Reform Act limits the court's power of appointment of
appellate attorneys in postconviction matters. 8 Since appointment is not a
matter of right, the court continued, trial courts should apply the standards of
Graham v. State,z 9 and when, as in the case under review, "no issues arepresent, let alone a complex one," counsel should not be appointed.2 °
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Arbelaez, 738 So. 2d at 327.
254. 714 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
255. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
256. Gantt, 714 So. 2d at 1116.
257. Id. at 1116-17.
258. Id. at 1117 (citing FLA. STAT. § 924.051 (1997)).
259. 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979).
260. Gantt, 714 So. 2d at 1117.
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E. Belated Appeals
In State v. Trowell,211 the supreme court resolved conflict among the
districts by concluding that a defendant who seeks a belated appeal after a
guilty plea need not allege that there exists a potentially meritorious issue. 
2
The court aligned itself with the approach taken by the First District in the
case under review263 and by the Fourth District in Gunn v. State,264 while
rejecting the conclusions to the contrary reached by the Second 265 and ThirdDistricts.266
XVI. APPEALS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,267 the supreme court
found that an order which initially terminates parental rights in a child
dependency case is a partial final judgment; 26' a partial final judgment is
reviewable either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal
269from the final judgment in the case.
The Second District, in K.W. v. Department of Children & Families,270
clarified the question of what steps appointed counsel should take when
unable to identify an arguable issue in an appeal from an order terminating
parental rights.A Alig1ing itself with the three district courts that had
spoken on the subject, the court rejected the necessity to follow the
procedures set forth in Anders v. California,273 which allows attorneys
261. 739 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1999).
262. Id. at 78.
263. Trowell v. State, 706 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc), decision
approved by 739 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1999).
264. 612 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
265. Bridges v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
266. White v. Singletary, 711 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), quashed in
part, 24 Fla. L. Weekly (Sept. 2, 1999) (quashing "the part of the decision below denying
petitioner's request for belated appeal").
267. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
268. Id. at 1185-86.
269. Id.
270. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D87 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1998).
271. Id. at D87.
272. See J.A. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 693 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997); Jimenez v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 669 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ostrum v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
273. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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handling criminal appeals to satisfy their ethical obligations under similar
circumstances. 
274
Instead, the court concluded that attorneys who cannot identify an
arpmable issue shall file motions to withdraw, reciting the necessity to do
so.75 The motion must include:
(1) the last known address of the parent; (2) a statement that, if
requested, counsel will assist the parent in obtaining the record; (3)
a request that the parent be given forty days to file a pro se brief;
and (4) a certificate of service upon all relevant parties, including
the parent."
276
The court indicated that upon receipt of a sufficient motion to withdraw, it
would enter and forward to the parent's last known address an order
allowing the parent to file a pro se brief within forty days.277 If no brief is
received, the motion to withdraw will be granted and the appeal dismissedY 8
If a brief is received, it will be examined to determine whether it raises a
preliminary basis for reversal.279 If so, the motion to withdraw will be
denied and counsel ordered to file a suwlemental brief.20 If not, the appeal
will be subject to summary affirmance.
XVII. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
The supreme court, in A.G. v. Department of Children & Family
Services,282 held that an order declaring a child dependent may be challenged283
on appeal from a subsequent final disposition order. The court found such
orders to be analogous to initial orders terminating parental rights that were
found in G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,'m discussed in the
preceding section of this article, and reviewable as a partial final judgment
or on appeal from a subsequent final judgment. 2 5
274. K.W., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D87 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967)).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. K.W., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D87.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999).
283. Id. at 1261-63.
284. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
285. Id. at 1261.
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In Department of Juvenile Justice v. E.R.,28 6 the Third District found
that the Department of Juvenile Justice has standing to appeal orders
modifying the commitment of juveniles.28 7 The same court concluded in
Department of Children & Families v. Morrison, s that the Department of
Children and Families had standing to challenge a circuit court order
directing the department to place a juvenile, who had been found
incompetent to stand trial, in a secure facility, in which there was no
integration of adult patients with juveniles.28 9
XVI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co.,290 the supreme court found that
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), which provides that "if a
party... is required or permitted to do an act within some prescribed time
after service of a document, and the document is served by mail, 5 days shall
be added to the prescribed period," does not extend the time for seeking
review pursuant to rule 9.400(c) of a trial court's order on appellate
attorney's fees.29 1 The court pointed out that rule 9.400(c) allows for review
within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed and that the five-
day mailing rule applies only when an act is to be done within a specified
number of days from service of a document.
292
XIX. COSTS
The appellant in Mulato v. Mulato293 appealed from a circuit court order
denying a motion for appellate costs.2 The motion was untimely under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a), which requires that such
motions be filed within thirty days of the issuance of mandate. 295 The Fourth
District affirmed the denial of the motion, finding that the time requirement
of the rule is jurisdictional and that compliance with it cannot be waived.296
286. 724 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
287. Id. at 130.
288.. 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
289. Id. at 405.
290. 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999).
291. Id. at 412-13.
292. Id. at 412 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.400(c)).
293. 734 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
294. Id. at 478.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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XX. REHEARING
The Fourth District granted a motion for rehearing in Teca, Inc. v. WM-
TAB, Inc.,297 withdrawing a per curiam affirmance and substituting an en
bane opinion reversing the judgment under review.29 8 In a specially con-
curring opinion, Judge Klein noted that the motion for rehearing was less
than two pages and was limited to one issue.299 Judge Klein then stated:
I believe there are two things which can be learned from this
experience. First, although Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.330 does not limit the length of motions for rehearing, long
motions for rehearing are not nearly as effective as short ones.
They should almost never exceed three or four pages. Second,
although we see far too many motions for rehearing, they can be
appropriate, even in cases which are initially affirmed without
opinion.
3 00
In DeBiasi v. Snaith,30 the Fourth District considered an appeal in a
legal malpractice case from an order granting summary judgment for the
defendant lawyer on the basis that alleged negligence was excused under the
doctrine of judgmental immunity.3°2 The attorney had filed a timely motion
for certification, rehearing, and rehearing en bane of an appellate decision.0 3
Within fifteen days of the denial of the motion, but more than fifteen days
after the opinion had been issued, the attorney filed a motion for certification
of conflict with decisions of other district courts and of a question of great
public importance.3 4 The motion for certification was denied as untimely
despite the attorney's argument that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.330 permits motions for certification to be filed within fifteen days of
orders denying rehearing.305  The lawyer's client then brought the
malpractice suit, alleging that the untimely filing of the motion for
certification deprived the client of the opportunity to have the appellate
decision overturned.3°
297. 726 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
298. Id. at 829.
299. Id. at 831 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
300. Id. (citations omitted).
301. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
302. Id. at 15.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. DeBiasi, 732 So. 2d at 15.
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The district court recognized that a literal reading of the rule presented
"a degree of ambiguity," but held that the filing of a motion for rehearing or
clarification does not toll the time for the filing of a motion for
certification.307 The court also stated that "mere 'ambiguity of a rule' of
procedure, without more, does not equate to the somewhat more amorphous
realm of 'fairly debatable' or 'unsettled area of the law' to which the
doctrine of judgmental immunity is applied."308  Accordingly, the court
reversed the order granting summary judgment. 309
310The Third District, in Perez v. State, granted the state's motion for
rehearing which asserted for the first time that the defendant did not preserve
an issue that had formed the basis for an opinion reversing the defendant's
conviction and sentence. 311 The court noted that in the past it had been
reluctant to consider new arguments made on rehearing that were not raised
312in the main appeal, but indicated that such a general practice does not
deter it from considering such an argument when recent developments in the
law or the justice of the cause persuades it to do So. 3 13 The court then
pointed to the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996, which
mandates that an appeal may not be taken from a trial court judgment or
order unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved or, if not,
would constitute fundamental error.Y4 In deciding to consider the state's
argument, the court stated that it was giving "great weight to the clearly
expressed intent of the Florida Legislature that review of criminal appeals
must be limited to those issues which have been properly preserved in the
trial court or which constitute fundamental error."
33
In Barnes v. State,316 the state filed a motion for rehearing which,
among other things, called the court's attention to an erroneous attribution in
, 317
the court's opinion. The motion was signed by an assistant attorney
general other than the one who had handled the case to that point and by an
assistant state attorney. 18 Without reaching any decision on the merits of
the motion, the court determined that it would issue a corrected opinion
deleting the attribution and accordingly sent a copy of the corrected opinion
307. Id. at 16.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 717 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
311. Id. at 605-06.
312. Id. at 606.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Perez, 717 So. 2d at 606.
316. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1250 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 26, 1999).
317. Id. at 1250.
318. Id.
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to West Publishing ("West"). 1 9 Shortly afterwards, the court received a
copy of a letter from the assistant state attorney to West asking that West
"withhold alteration of any portion of the opinion" until the court had finally
disposed of the case.
320
Subsequently, a document styled as "Appellee's Supplemental Motion
for Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc," signed only by the assistant state
attorney, was filed. 321 The court then issued an order to the attorney general
and'the assistant state attorney to show cause why the supplemental motion
should not be stricken as unauthorized. The order called attention to
section 16.01(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides that the attorney
general shall handle all suits in the district courts of appeal, and section
27.02 of the Florida Statutes, which indicates that the state attorney shall
appear in the circuit and county courts on behalf of the state."
The assistant attorney general who signed the motion for rehearing filed
a response which indicated that the supplemental motion was filed without
any prior notice to the attorney general's office.324 The response did not
adopt any part of the supplemental motion.32 The assistant state attorney
also filed a response, recognizing the statutory provisions cited in the court's
order, but arguing that a state attorney has a common law right unaffected by
those statutes to represent the state in criminal appeals. 3
The defendant filed a reply to the assistant state attorney's response,
bringing to the court's attention that there had never been a motion to
substitute counsel for the initial assistant attorney general on the case and the
fact that the state attorney's office, "apparently unhappy with the
performance of the Attorney General's office," did not become involved
with the case until after the issuance of the court's opinion. 327 The defendant
also contended that the state attorney's office had a "recent practice" of
intervening in cases when a decision of the court was "adverse to that
office," and asked that the court strike the supplemental motion.
32
The court indicated that none of the cases cited by the assistant state
attorney had decided that a state attorney has a common law right to
represent the state in a higher court.329 Rather, the court said, they merely
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1250.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1250.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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showed that a state attorney represented one of the parties.330  "We can
understand why the Attorney General might prefer to appoint the State
Attorney... to represent the state" on appeal in particular cases, the court
noted. The mere fact that the attorney general may have done so in certain
situations, the court continued, "does not create any common law right in an
assistant state attorney to represent the state in an appellate court without the
express authorization of the Attorney General. 332
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the attorney
general apparently did approve of the assistant state attorney's participation
in the preparation of the initial motion for rehearing, but that the
supplemental motion was not approved by the attorney general.3 3 The court
therefore deemed the supplemental motion to be unauthorized and granted
the defendant's motion to strike it.334 In a footnote, the court provided some
insight into the manner in which it makes appropriate non-substantive
corrections, such as the one arising from the erroneous attribution in the case
under review and cautioned attorneys not to take it upon themselves to
become involved in the publication process.
335
Although we have struck the supplemental motion for rehearing,
we do wish to stress that our opinions are subject to correction by
us at any time before we have decided pending motions for
rehearing. We frequently correct an opinion promptly when
someone calls our attention to a factual, grammatical, orthographic
or other kind of error, inaccuracy or omission not necessarily
affecting any substantive decision on our part. The lawyers
involved need draw no dire conclusions from our so doing except
that we desire to remove such errors from an opinion no matter
what else we might do. And, we trust, we need not bother to
explain why it is not for attorneys representing the parties in a case
in our court to attempt to tamper with the publication of our
decisions or to attempt to countermand our directions to West
Publishing.33
6
330. Id. at D1250-51.
331. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1251.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Barnes, 24 Fa. L. Weekly at D1252 n.4.
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XXI. MANDATE
In Raulerson v. State,337 one panel of the Fourth District affirmed a
338criminal defendant's conviction without opinion. Several months later, a
different panel, considering the same issue that had been raised by the
defendant, reversed the conviction of a codefendant.339 After the defendant
filed a motion to recall mandate in his case, the court withdrew the mandate
in the codefendant's case in order to resolve the conflict.4 After an en banc
conference, the court was persuaded that the opinion in the co-defendant's
case was correct and that the defendant's conviction should not have been
affirmed.3 4
The court indicated that the defendant's motion to recall mandate would
have been appropriate had the court still been in the same term of court in
which his conviction was affirmed.342 Since the motion was not filed until
after the term of court had expired, however, the court concluded that it did
not have the authority to recall the mandate.343 The court therefore treated
the motion to recall mandate as a petition for habeas corpus granted the
petition, and vacated the defendant's conviction and sentence.
3
XXII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Over the upcoming year, the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee
will submit to the supreme court the committee's four-year cycle report. This
report will set forth proposed amendments to the rules. The changes that the
court decides to adopt will unquestionably have a significant impact on
appellate practice in Florida.
Of course, the courts in the next year will provide answers to many of
the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These answers, as
they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These questions, and
others, will continue to provide the large number of court decisions that
shape the field of appellate practice.
337. 724 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
338. Id. at 642.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Raulerson, 724 So. 2d at 642-43.
343. Id. at 643.
344. Id
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